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ESSEX LEASING: SPECIFIC PERIOD OF
NONUSE IS ENOUGH
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of America's urban areas has increased reliance on
governments' regulation of the urban environment. Governments
manage urban development primarily through comprehensive zoning
ordinances.' Comprehensive zoning, which requires future use of de-
veloped lands to conform with urban planning goals, is generally pre-
sumed to be constitutional.2 Municipalities historically could enact
zoning ordinances retroactively to extinguish a present use.3 Recently,
courts have been less willing to apply zoning ordinances retroactively.4
Recent cases also indicate another reversal in policy, a return to a less
burdensome method of extinguishing nonconforming uses.5
Nonconforming uses are created by prospective application of zon-
ing ordinances. An existing use may generally continue after the effec-
tive date of a new zoning ordinance prohibiting the existing use.
Because this lingering use does not conform to the newly enacted zon-
ing measure, it is allowed under an exception for nonconforming uses.
This Recent Development examines the history, restraints, and at-
tempts to terminate nonconforming uses. Specifically, this paper fo-
1. Comprehensive zoning is the division of an entire municipality into districts for
the purpose of restricting land use by geographical area. R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING § 1.12 (1968). New York City enacted the first comprehensive zoning
plan in 1916. See Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REv. 834 (1924).
2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, § 2.15 and § 5.60 (1988).
4. See e.g., Thomson v. Village of Tequesta Board of Adjustment, 546 So. 2d 457
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Sheston Oil Co., Inc. v. Borough of Avalon Planning Board,
214 N.J. Super. 593, 520 A.2d 802 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). But cf City of
Portland v. Fisherman's Wharf Associates II, 541 A.2d 160 (Me. 1988).
5. Id. at § 5.60.
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cuses on Essex Leasing v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,6 a recent decision by
the Supreme Court of Connecticut that liberalizes a municipality's abil-
ity to extinguish nonconforming uses.
II. ZONING AND THE NONCONFORMING USE
A. The Zoning Power Base
Local governments enact zoning ordinances pursuant to police pow-
ers.7 States, through enabling legislation, confer these powers on local
governments.' Zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to this power usu-
ally divide a territory into districts designated for certain defined uses. 9
Advocates of zoning ordinances advance many justifications for such
regulations. One justification is the classic view that zoning ordinances
are a legislative refinement of common law nuisance."° Other explana-
tions include the separation of industrial and residential neighbor-
hoods, reducing traffic congestion and enhancement of fire protection
capabilities.1" Zoning ordinances ideally achieve strict separation of
land uses while minimizing the negative impact of designated uses on
adjoining land values. 2
The Supreme Court declared in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty
6. 206 Conn. 595, 539 A.2d 101 (Conn. 1988).
7. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Jones v. City of
Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 307, 295 P. 14, 16 (1930). The United States Supreme Court
has defined the police power broadly: "[The police] power is not confined ... to the
suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary. It extends to so dealing with
the conditions which exist in the State as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its
people." Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 318 (1907). See also Commonwealth v.
Barnes & Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115, 126-27, 371 A.2d 461, 467, appeal dismissed, 434
U.S. 807 (1977) (recent expression of the same police power theory).
8. All states have delegated some zoning authority to municipalities. R. ANDER-
SON, supra note 1, at § 3.08. The delegation must be specific. A general grant of police
power is insufficient to authorize zoning. Poulos v. Caparrelli, 25 Conn. Supp. 370, 378,
205 A.2d 382, 386 (Conn. Supr. Ct. 1964); Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So.
2d 193, 195 (Fla. 1966).
9. R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 1.12.
10. Id. at § 6.02.
11. Galanes v. Town of Brattleboro, 136 Vt. 235, 388 A.2d 406 (1978).
12. Achieving such a result was the primary goal of the earliest zoners. See S. Toll,
Zoned America 183 (1969); Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 305, 407 n.8 (1955) (protecting property values on Fifth
Avenue in New York).
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Co. 3 that zoning ordinances restricting the use of an owner's land did
not result in a taking violation under the fifth or fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution.14 The Court upheld the ordi-
nance as a constitutional exercise of the village's police power.' 5 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged the municipality's
need for flexible police power in light of changing circumstances and
conditions.' 6 However, the Court stated that the exercise of the power
must bear a rational relationship to the health, safety, morals, and gen-
eral welfare of the community. 7 In addition, the Court cautioned that
ordinances applied arbitrarily would be unenforceable.'" Since Euclid,
courts have greatly expanded the objectives of the zoning power.19
B. The Nonconforming Use
A nonconforming use is a lawful, continued use of land, building, or
premises which lawfully existed prior to the effective date of a zoning
13. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The property in question was situated near a developing
industrial district. Id. at 371.
14. Id at 384. The plaintiff attacked a zoning ordinance that allegedly reduced the
value of his land from S10,000 to $2,500 per acre. The landowner also asserted that the
ordinance violated the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution in that it de-
prived him of his life, liberty, and property without due process of law. Id. For a discus-
sion of the application of the due process clause to the substantive content of
government actions, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 553-86, 1302-
1435 (1988).
Courts have recognized that the right to make future use of land is a "property"
interest for due process purposes. For example, in Euclid the court explicitly assumed
the presence of a property interest in order to reach the issue of whether due process
was afforded in the invasion of the landowner's property rights. 272 U.S. at 386. For
additional discussion of this principle, see City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382,
388, 116 N.E.2d 697, 700 (1953), in which the court defined property as "not merely the
ownership and possession of lands or chattels but the unrestricted right of their use,
enjoyment and disposal." See also Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 356, 235 S.W.
513, 515 (1921) (police power is subject to an inferred constitutional limitation).
15. 272 U.S. at 397.
16. Id. at 387.
17. Id. at 395. The means were reasonably designed to meet the objectives of insur-
ing the safety of children, facilitating fire protection and minimizing municipal ex-
penses. Id.
18. Id. at 395; See also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928)
(Supreme Court struck down a zoning ordinance as unreasonable as applied).
19. Courts have upheld zoning ordinances with the following purposes: Forde v.
City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 685, 1 So. 2d 642, 647 (1941) (maintenance of
property values); Leis v. District of Columbia, 190 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (stabiliza-
tion of land use).
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ordinance. This continued use, however, does not comply with the use
restrictions of the zoning ordinance.2° The nature of activities re-
quired to establish a nonconforming use varies among the courts.
Some jurisdictions find that the use must be generally apparent to the
neighborhood.21 Other jurisdictions hold that the use must be law-
ful, 22 in existence on the enactment date of the ordinance,23 and more
than an occasional use.24
Many state statutes expressly protect the nonconforming use.25
Early zoning ordinances exempted nonconforming uses.26 A few crit-
ics argue that the need to eliminate the nonconforming use is overem-
phasized because a nonconforming use would not significantly impair
effective zoning, and the occupant or owner of a property would give
up the nonconforming use over time.27 To encourage the gradual elim-
ination of nonconforming uses, local authorities have enacted ordi-
nances which hamper its continued exercise.28
20. 6 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 41.01 (1978).
21. See Fairlawns Cemetery Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 138 Conn. 434,445, 86 A.2d
74, 80 (1952).
22. Ralston Purina Co. v. Acrey, 220 Ga. 788, 791, 142 S.E.2d 66, 69 (1965) (bur-
den of proof is on person seeking to establish legality of nonconforming use); Eggert v.
Board of Appeals, 29 Ill. 2d 591, 599, 195 N.E.2d 164, 169 (1963) (building code plain-
tiff violated upheld as constitutional); In Re Besthoff v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 34
A.D.2d 782, 311 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (1970) (property with nonconforming use prior to
present zoning ordinance governed by prior zoning ordinance); Larson v. Howland, 108
N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (violation of restrictive covenant by constructing a
gas station).
23. See, e.g., Fairlawns Cemetery Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 138 Conn. 434, 443-45,
86 A.2d 74, 79-80 (1952); Whitpain Township v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509, 511-13, 94 A.2d
737, 739-40 (1953).
24. See Durning v. Summerfield, 314 Ky. 318, 321-22, 235 S.W.2d 761, 763 (1951)
(occasional use as a carnival was not a nonconforming use).
25. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-462.02 (1977 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 8-2 (1989); HAwAI REV. STAT. § 205-8 (1985).
26. Bettman, supra note 1, at 853. A typical early clause provided: "The lawful use
of a building or premises existing at the time of the adoption of this ordinance may be
continued, although such use does not conform with the provisions hereof, and such use
may be extended throughout the building." Waukegan, Ill. Zoning Ord. 29 (1924)
quoted in Note, Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9
U. CI. L. REv. 477, 478, n.5 (1942). See also ordinance cited in Comment, The Abate-
ment of Preexisting Nonconforming Uses Under Zoning Laws: Amortization, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 323, 323 n.1-2 (1962).
27. Comment, Conforming The Nonconforming Use: Proposed Legislative Relief For
A Zoning Dilemma, 33 Sw. L.J. 855 (1979).
28. See infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
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III. RESTRAINTS ON NONCONFORMING USES
A. Restraints on Nonconforming Use Modification
A majority of zoning ordinances limit the modification of noncon-
29forming uses. Commonly, ordinances state that a nonconforming use
"shall not change except to a use permitted in the district in which it is
located." 0 Other ordinances provide that the use must remain identi-
cal or at least substantially similar to the original use."1 Still others
allow modification of the use, but only those that bring the use into
stricter compliance with the zoning requirements.32
B. Restraints on Nonconforming Use Expansion
Nonconforming use status does not constitute an unlimited right to
expand.3 3 A landowner wishing to expand must generally allege that
he contemplated the intensification of the use when the use became
nonconforming.3 4 In addition, courts may permit expansion if the na-
ture of the nonconforming use at the time of enactment of the zoning
ordinance has not changed. 35 For example, in Stuckman v. Kosciusko
County Bd. of Appeals, 36 the court held that a small nonconforming
business cannot change so as to effect a change in kind on the neighbor-
hood. The nonconforming business can, however, cause a change that
would result in an increase in business.3 7 In Stuckman, the court per-
29. 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 20, at § 41.03[3][a].
30. D. MANDELKER, supra note 3, at § 5.61.
31. 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 20 at 41.03[2][a]. For an example of such an ordinance,
see Everpure Ice Mfg. Co. v. Bd. of Appeals, 324 Mass. 433, 86 N.E.2d 906 (1949).
32. See, e.g., Stem v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 140 Conn. 241, 244-46, 99 A.2d 130,
132 (1953); City of Hagerstown v. Wood, 257 Md. 558, 263 A.2d 532 (1970); Redford
Moving & Storage Co. v. City of Detroit, 336 Mich. 702, 58 N.W.2d 812 (1953).
In Belleville v. Parrillo's, Inc., 416 A.2d 388 (N.J. 1980), the court held that a modifi-
cation in use from a nonconforming restaurant to a discotheque was impermissible.
After reviewing the applicable rules for modification of nonconforming uses, the court
concluded: "Defendant's conversion of the premises from a restaurant to a discotheque
resulted in a substantial, and therefore impermissible change. The entire character of
the business has been altered .... Measured by the zoning ordinance the general wel-
fare of the neighborhood has been demonstrably affected adversely.... ." Id. at 393.
33. 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 20, at § 41.03[3][a].
34. D. MANDELKER, supra note 3, at § 5.61.
35. Id.
36. 495 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. App. 1986).
37. Id. at 776. In this case, the plaintiffs, owners of a nonconforming junkyard,
increased their inventory of cars by making more area available on their existing lots.
Id.
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mitted the expansion because the plaintiff merely increased the produc-
tivity of the land. In addition, the business purpose and its effect on
adjacent landowners had not changed.38
Though Connecticut has adopted a liberal view of "natural expan-
sion and growth,"3 9 courts nevertheless have applied this doctrine con-
servatively. In Connecticut Sand & Stone Corp. v. Zoning Board of
Appeals of The Town of Avon, 4 for example, a Connecticut court held
that an excavating and extracting venture could not manufacture
ready-mix concrete because this expanded its operation of a sand and
gravel plant and thus violated local zoning regulations. 41 The court,
however, held that the sand and gravel plant could adopt a more effi-
cient method or instrument of production if it were reasonably adapted
to the original use of the property.42
Courts may also limit an expansion if such extension has a reason-
able probability of devaluing neighboring land.43 Some courts, how-
ever, permit expansion despite prohibitive ordinances if the expansion
does not substantially affect the health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare." Courts may also allow expansion upon a showing of hardship.4"
C. Restraints on the Resumption of a Nonconforming Use After
Abandonment or Discontinuance
Zoning ordinances usually grant municipalities the power to termi-
38. Id.
39. Comment, Zoning and the Nonconforming Use in Connecticut, 45 CONN. B.J.
427 (1971).
40. Connecticut Sand and Stone Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Avon, 150
Conn. 439, 190 A.2d 594 (1963).
41. Id. at 440, 190 A.2d at 595.
42. Id. at 442, 190 A.2d at 596.
43. Jobert v. Morant, 150 Conn. 584, 588, 192 A.2d 553, 555 (1963).
44. See Hoffarth v. County of St. Clair, 51111. App. 3d 763, 366 N.E.2d 365 (1977)
(court denied expansion of archery range in rural area based on a substantial effect on
health, safety, morals and general welfare).
45. See, eg., Home Fuel Oil Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 5 N.J. Super. 63, 66, 68
A.2d 412, 413, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949) (property in question needed a street
for its use where the property was in a non-industrial zone); Crudeli v. Zoning Bd. of
Review, 73 R.I. 301, 55 A.2d 284 (1947) (hardship to disallow construction of a drive-
way providing access to a building lawfully under construction); cf. Snyder v. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 20 Pa. Commw. 139, 141-42, 341 A.2d 546, 548 (1975) (applicant seeking




nate an abandoned nonconforming use.4 6 Constitutional issues may
arise, however, if a municipality applies its abandonment provision to
terminate an abandoned nonconforming use.47 A court may conclude
that the termination is unconstitutional if the owner's abandonment
was involuntary.48 Courts generally avoid these constitutional issues
by requiring that the abandonment be voluntary.49 Some courts hold
that voluntary abandonment occurs if two essential elements are
present: (1) an overt act of abandonment, and (2) the intent to aban-
don.5 ° Other courts consider discontinued use sufficient evidence of
the intent to abandon while others insist on a clear showing of intent.5
Many courts have adopted the two elements of the abandonment rule
even if the zoning ordinance used "discontinuance" instead of
"abandonment." 5 2
IV. ESSEX LEASING v ZONING BD. OF APPEALS
In Essex Leasing v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,53 a building owner chal-
lenged a zoning regulation terminating a nonconforming use solely as a
result of nonuse for one year. The regulation 4 followed Connecticut's
46. See Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach, 6 Cal. 3d 279, 286, 491 P.2d 369, 373, 98
Cal Rptr. 785, 789 (1971); City of Lima v. Hempker, 118 Ohio App. 321, 194 N.E.2d
585 (1962). Change in ownership is not an abandonment. Instead, the new owner may
continue the nonconforming use. People v. Smith, 38 Ill. App. 3d 798, 799, 349 N.E.2d
91, 92 (1976).
47. D. MANDELKER, supra note 3, at § 5.60.
48. Id.
49. D. MANDELKER, supra note 3, at § 5.63.
50. Grushkin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norwalk, 26 Conn. Sup. Ct. 457, 460, 227
A.2d 98, 100 (1967).
51. Mifflin v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 3 Pa. Commw. 485, 284 A.2d 320 (1971); Bor-
ough of Saddle River v. Bobinski, 108 N.J. Super. 6, 259 A.2d 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1969) (nonuse after 27 years did not constitute abandonment).
52. Some courts have interpreted discontinuance as synonymous with abandonment
requiring the intent element. Dubitzky v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 Conn. 120, 127,
273 A.2d 876, 880 (1970); Smith v. Howard, 407 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Ky. 1966).
53. 206 Conn. 595, 539 A.2d 101 (1988).
54. Id. at 606-07, 539 A.2d at 107. The regulation provides:
50E. TERMINATION. Except as provided in 50F., no use of any land or im-
provement having a non-conforming characteristic and no non-conforming use
or characteristic of land or improvement shall be resumed or restored;
50E.1 CESSATION. If such use or characteristic has not existed for a period of
one year from the date of cessation or from the effective date of the applicable
regulation, whichever is later; or
50E.2. ABANDONMENT. If it is abandoned. [U]nless such use conforms to
1990]
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long-standing policy of eliminating nonconforming uses as quickly as
the fair interest of the parties would permit." Under the regulation,
the court interpreted the term "cessation" as not requiring intent to
abandon the use, 6 and therefore refused to look to the owner's motive
to see whether he had intended to abandon the nonconforming use.
In Essex Leasing, a portion of the building was a legal nonconform-
ing commercial use.57 The portion in question was vacant for approxi-
mately two years but the tenant continued to pay rent and to maintain
that portion of the building. 8 Essex Leasing filed an application to
continue its nonconforming use in conjunction with its impending
purchase of the building. 9 The zoning officer denied the permit and
the zoning board upheld the officer's decision." The Superior Court,
Judicial District of Middlesex, reversed the zoning board.6 1 The Ap-
pellate Court of Connecticut agreed with the zoning board's determi-
nation and set aside the judgment.62 The Supreme Court of
Connecticut agreed with the zoning board as well.63
The plaintiff advanced three grounds on which the appellate court
these Regulations or such use or characteristic has been authorized by the grant
of the Zoning Bd. of Appeals of a variance in the application of the pertinent
regulation.
55. Id. at 599, 539 A.2d at 104.
56. Id
57. Id. at 596, 539 A.2d at 102.
58. The plaintiff's immediate predecessor in title leased the building to a commer-
cial tenant. 206 Conn. 595, 596, 539 A.2d 101, 102. In 1981, the tenant ceased opera-
tions but paid rent and occupied the premises until March 1983. Id. at 597, 539 A.2d at
102.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 597, 539 A.2d at 102-03.
61. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court on three grounds: (1) The Board had no
authority under the zoning enabling act to terminate the nonconforming use solely on
nonuse. (2) The Board misconstrued 50E. I as requiring no showing of intent to discon-
tinue the nonconforming use. (3) The record did not show that a one year period of
nonuse occurred. Id. The trial court ruled on the plaintiff's second ground that the
term "cessation" in 50E.1 in its ordinary meaning was synonymous with "discontinu-
ance" which has been interpreted to require a showing of intent. Therefore, the trial
court sustained the appeal since the board had not considered intent. Id. at 598, 539
A.2d at 103.
62. Id. at 598, 539 A.2d at 103. The appellate court ruled that the trial court's
construction of 50E. 1 was erroneous. The court held the general statutes permit local
zoning regulations to terminate a nonconforming use solely in a period of nonuse and
that the town of Essex had adopted such a regulation. Id.
63. Id at 595, 539 A.2d at 101. The Supreme Court of Connecticut remanded the
case to the trial court to determine whether the record factually supports the board's
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/14
ESSEX LEASING
was in error. First, the owner argued that the term "cessation"" in the
Town's zoning ordinance was synonymous with discontinuance and
therefore required proof of intent. The court found that the ordinance
as a whole manifests a clear intent to terminate nonconforming uses by
two distinct and independent means.6" The court reasoned that be-
cause the section governing abandonment terminates nonconforming
uses that owners have intentionally abandoned, the section governing
abandonment must represent a different standard.66 The court found
that the Town of Essex had adopted a bifurcated system to extinguish
the nonconforming uses. In that system the traditional standard of
abandonment coexists with an alternative standard of nonuse for a
specified period of time.67
Second, the owner argued that the cessation ordinance created no
more than a rebuttable presumption of relinquishment of a noncon-
forming use.68 Because the Essex ordinance's "cessation" standard al-
lowed the termination of a nonconforming use without regard to
intent, the court found the ordinance avoided the unconstitutional, ar-
bitrary deprivation of property that would result if the ordinance re-
quired a showing of intent. 69 Thus, the court distinguished cases in
other jurisdictions that were interpreted as creating a rebuttable pre-
sumption to avoid unconstitutionality.
70
Finally, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim that Essex exceeded its
contention that the plaintiff did not use the property for one year. Id. at 608, 539 A.2d
at 108.
64. The court noted the potential harsh effects of 50E. 1 are mitigated by Essex Zon-
ing regulation 50F which provides: "[a] nonconforming use or characteristic of an im-
provement which is damaged by fire or other casualty to any extent may be restored or
resumed subject to certain restrictions." Id at 602 n.2, 539 A.2d at 105 n.2.
65. Id. at 601, 539 A.2d at 104. In Bartlett v. Bd. of Appeals, the court upheld a
zoning ordinance which terminated nonconforming uses after a period of two years. 23
Mass. App. Ct. 664, 505 N.E.2d 193 (1987). The court reasoned that the legislature had
decided to adopt an objective standard. Id at 670, 505 N.E.2d at 197.
66. The court also supported the policy of diminishing nonconforming uses as
quickly as the fair interest of the parties will permit. Id. at 601, 539 A.2d at 105 (quot-
ing Weyls v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 290 A.2d 350 (1971)).
67. Essex at 601, 539 A.2d at 104.
68. Id. Plaintiff cited two cases which found a rebuttable presumption of noncon-
forming use. Minot v. Fisher, 212 N.W.2d 837, 841 (N.D. 1973) ("discontinuance"
standard); California Car Wash, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board, 98 Pa. Commw. 209,
510 A.2d 931, 933 n.l (1986) ("abandonment" standard).
69. Essex at 601, 539 A2d at 104.
70. Id. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing cases finding a rebut-
table presumption of intent).
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authority under the state zoning enabling act.7 1 The court found the
ordinance did not "prohibit the continuance" of a nonconforming use,
as proscribed by the enabling act, but merely enabled the Town to seize
upon the owners lack of "continuance.', 72
V. CONCLUSION
Zoning regulations stabilize land use in order to promote the general
welfare of each community. Courts agree that nonconforming uses
should be extinguished as soon as justice permits. In Essex Leasing the
court upheld a municipality's power to terminate a nonconforming use
solely because of nonuse for a specified time period. This decision fol-
lows a growing trend of cases which adopt an objective standard for
terminating nonconforming uses.
Michael L. Mason*
71. Id at 605, 539 A.2d at 106.
72. Id at 607, 539 A.2d at 107.
* J.D. 1989, Washington University
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/14
